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The E-Books Price Fixing Litigation:
Curious Outlier or Harbinger of Change
in Antitrust Enforcement Policy?
by EVAN D. BREWER

*

Note: After this paper was written, the case against Apple was
tried to bench in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. On July 10, 2013, Judge Denise Cote found
Apple had committed a per se Sherman Act violation by conspiring
with the publishers to eliminate retail price competition and to raise
†
e-book prices.
The discussion here, based in part on the
Government’s allegations against Apple in the complaint, echoes
much of Judge Cote’s analysis. It remains unknown, however, why
the government chose to pursue a civil action, and what its choice
means for antitrust enforcement policy going forward.
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I. Introduction
In 2012 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought suit against
Apple and five major US publishing houses for conspiring to fix the
1
price of e-books. The suit named five of the six largest publishers in
the United States: HarperCollins, Hachette, Macmillan, Penguin, and
2
Simon & Schuster.
The complaint contained many detailed factual allegations,
including the sort of high-level executive collusion commonly seen in
3
criminal price fixing cases. The charged conduct, horizontal price
fixing, is per se illegal under the Sherman Act and among the
“hardcore” violations that under Antitrust Division policy merit

1. Complaint, United States v. Apple, et al., No. 12 CV 2826, 2012 WL 1193205
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint].
2. In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Random House, also one of the six largest publishers, was not named. Id. at 1, n.1.
3. A recent example is the AU Optronics LCD price fixing litigation. See
Superseding Indictment, United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. CR-09-0110, 2010 WL
5641429 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2010).
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4

criminal charges. Yet the government brought a civil case against
Apple and the publishers. Exactly why the Division chose to pursue
the matter as a civil rather than criminal case may never be totally
clear: the decision was made at a high level and the specific details of
5
such decision making are not made available to the public. But
analysis of the details of the Division’s case, viewed in light of current
antitrust law, antitrust policy, and public perception of the players
and the case, suggests a number of possible explanations for the
choice of a civil action.
The decision may reflect a shift in DOJ or Antitrust Division
policy concerning the criminality of per se antitrust violations. Or it
may augur a change in department policy regarding discretion to file
civil versus criminal suits depending on the strength of the case.
Another possibility is a change in the DOJ’s opinion about the
application of per se and rule of reason modes of analysis to
horizontal price fixing. Finally, and most likely, I believe, the
decision could have been motivated by the particular facts of the case.
The government may have judged the departure from policy justified
by prudential reasons, including public perception of antitrust
enforcement, questions about the deterrence efficacy of criminal
sanctions, and concerns about over enforcement in dynamic, hightech sectors. If this is correct, it is possible the decision simply be an
aberration, a one-time departure from enforcement policy, or a
harbinger of a more flexible enforcement policy.
On the one hand, because there seem to have been no other
indications of a broader shift, it seems likeliest this case is simply an
outlier. On the other, the facts of this case illustrate many good
reasons for such a shift in policy. Regardless, opacity in decisionmaking endangers both deterrence efforts and public confidence in
antitrust enforcement agencies. Thus whether this is simply a one-off
oddity or reflects a farther-reaching change, antitrust enforcement
and those affected by it would all be well served by more
transparency concerning antitrust prosecution decisions.
This paper begins with a discussion of the background of the
case. Part I describes the rise of e-books over the past several years;
Part II lays out the alleged conspiracy and the details behind the
Agency Agreements signed between Apple and the defendant

4. See Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in
Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
5. Final decisions are made by the Assistant Attorney General in consultation with
senior officials in the Antitrust Division following an extensive analytical process. Id. at
408 n.21.
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publishers; Part III the industry’s rapid shift from wholesale to agency
e-book distribution. In Part IV I discuss the deterrence rationale for
criminal sanctions.
Part V details application of and recent
developments in the antitrust modes of analysis, the per se rule and
the rule of reason, and how the alleged conspiracy fits in. It also
discusses the government’s proposed definition of the relevant
market. Part VI examines strategic considerations that likely weighed
on the Division’s decision to bring a civil case. And Part VII puts it
all together and reviews possible explanations. The final section
concludes.

II. Background
A. The Rise of E-Books

E-books have proven a disruptive force in the publishing
6
industry. Production, distribution, and retailing costs are all lower
for e-books than for their physical counterparts. So, too, are e-book
prices. But how much lower? An entire industry rides on the answer
to this question, and the machinations of major companies in tech,
retail, and publishing to provide one are at the heart of the
government’s case.
Though not directly involved in the case, Amazon is central to
the dispute. Through its online sales portal and Kindle e-reader,
Amazon’s aggressive marketing and sales popularized reading on
tablets and devices and in large part birthed the e-book industry.
Amazon’s success hinged on its strategy of selling e-books for $9.99,
7
particularly newly released and bestselling titles. This price is well
below the price of corresponding hardcover editions, and often below
8
the wholesale prices paid to the publishers. For Amazon, this sales
model of razor-thin, or in some cases nonexistent, margins powered
sales of Kindles and enabled them to capture the nascent e-book

6. See Complaint at ¶ 2; Letter from Scott Turow: Grim News, THE AUTHORS
GUILD BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012) (Authors Guild President Scott Turow describing impacts of
e-books on the publishing industry), available at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/
letter-from-scott-turow-grim-news/.
7. Complaint at ¶¶ 2–4.
8. Because it is easier, I refer to the transactions of e-books between the publishers,
retailers and consumers as sales, though in reality, like many other electronic goods, ebooks are distributed via licenses and sub-licenses. Amazon licenses an e-book from the
publisher, and subsequently licenses it to the end user who reads it on their Kindle, or
other device.
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market. At the point Apple entered the market, nearly 90% of all e9
books were sold through Amazon.
Amazon’s success, however, was seen by publishers as a major,
possibly existential threat. Plummeting prices of e-books, they
argued, would give rise to consumer expectations for similarly low
10
prices of print books. Receding margins in the market for print
books, and small margins for e-books would combine to imperil the
industry. If publishers were unable to recoup investments in book
production, the industry would grind to a halt, output falling to a
11
trickle of current day production. This $9.99 problem—falling prices
and consumer expectations of falling prices—lies at the heart of the
alleged conspiracy.
Apple entered the scene in 2010 with its launch of the iPad and
iBookstore. The publishers saw Apple, an influential and disruptive
player in many markets, as a potential ally with whom they might
challenge Amazon’s influence over retail e-book prices. Their
interests were closely aligned: Although Apple was not overly
concerned with the publishers’ $9.99 problem, it was uninterested in
competing with Amazon on price. Apple did (and does) not need to
sell e-books at a loss to generate sales of its iPad, which is more
12
computer than e-reader. Apple makes money off its hardware,
whereas Amazon’s motivations are more complex. Because it
entered the e-book market in its infancy, Amazon was more
interested in establishing the market for e-books than turning a profit.
Even as the market has matured, Amazon continues to sell Kindles at
13
a loss. Amazon’s real motivations lie in selling content, services, and
9. Turow, supra note 6.
10. Brad Stone & Motoko Rich, With Rival E-Book Readers, It’s Amazon v. Apple, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at B1 (reporting that “publishers fear that Amazon has accustomed
buyers to unreasonably low prices” and believe “if Kindle were to maintain its dominant
position, it could force publishers to lower their wholesale prices.”).
11. Publishers finance many if not most major titles in advance. Because author
profits from books come after publication, advance payments provide the necessary
income smoothing for authors to undertake long writing projects by essentially borrowing
against future expected income from the book. See Jim Kukral, The New Business Model of
Book Publishing, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jimkukral/ebook-publishing_b_1428197.html.
12. Apple’s gross profit margin on iPhones is an astounding 60%, and the principal
reason Apple is the most valuable company in the world. See Thomas J. Duesterberg, The
Apple Business Model Is Good for U.S. Manufacturing, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-j-duesterberg/us-manufacturing-apple_b_1072089.
html.
13. Hayley Tsukayama, Amazon Loses $3 on Every Kindle Fire, WASH. POST (Nov. 18,
2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-18/business/35282380_1_kindle-firenook-tablet-e-reader.
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goods across many categories, and many of its ventures are designed
14
to bring more users to the Amazon brand. Apple wanted to offer ebooks, but doing so at prices significantly higher than Amazon would
serve them little good, and in fact might turn people off if they saw
higher prices as Apple taking advantage of their customers.
The agency model provided a solution to both Apple and the
publishers’ problems. Apple sought a way to avoid retail price
competition with Amazon, and the publishers wanted to take away
Amazon’s pricing power. As it turned out, Apple proved a powerful
ally, with whom the publishers collaborated to break Amazon’s
stranglehold on the retail e-book market, and introduce competition
and a sustainable business model to the industry. Either that, or they
illegally colluded to fix the price of, and restrain retail price
competition in the market for, e-books.
B. The Alleged Conspiracy

The collusion alleged in the Complaint is a hub-and-spoke
conspiracy hatched by Apple and the publishers to solve a collective
15
action problem. This collective action problem stemmed from the
fact that the publishers faced monopsony, with Amazon as the only
16
real buyer of e-books.
With nowhere else to sell e-books, the
publishers sold to Amazon, on Amazon’s terms. Although they all
wanted to end Amazon’s discounting, they could not do so without
coordination. Apple’s involvement proved instrumental in helping
the publishers do just that.
1. Collective Action Problems

To solve the $9.99 problem, the publishers could have insisted on
minimum retail price agreements with Amazon. Such arrangements
would avoid antitrust issues because retail price maintenance
17
scrutiny is limited to the sales of goods and does not extend to

14. See, e.g., Mark W. Johnson, Amazon’s Smart Innovation Strategy, BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/apr2010/id20100412
_520351.htm (describing Amazon’s application of this business strategy across a number of
markets).
15. Complaint at ¶¶ 46, 60–84.
16. Amazon’s advantage as the popularizer of e-books should not be understated: it
allowed them to capture nearly the entire market and made entry by others very difficult
without competing on price, something few have been able to do in any market Amazon
has entered.
17. Minimum and maximum retail price restrictions, as vertical price fixing
agreements, were per se violations of the Sherman Act until 2007, when the Supreme
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18

licensing rights to intellectual property. However, the publishers
faced a collective action problem that prevented this solution.
In such a situation, what is best for the group is not best for the
individual acting alone, and the optimal group outcome requires
19
cooperation.
While the publishers shared a desire for higher
minimum prices, each individual publisher was deterred from acting
unilaterally by the prospect that the others would not follow. If one
publisher renegotiated its contract with Amazon to require higher
minimum retail prices, the others would have an incentive to not
follow suit—to defect from the optimal group behavior. By not
following, publishers would see an increase in their respective shares
of the market as consumers switched to their e-books on account of
the price differential. Even if most publishers ignored the profit
potential of defection and followed the first mover, the more
publishers switched, the greater the incentive to defect would be for
20
each remaining publisher. As a result, the optimal outcome for the
publishers, higher minimum retail prices, was unlikely to arise
without coordination. Or, according to the DOJ, unlawful collusion.
2. Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy

Coordinating through Apple to adopt agency distribution proved
an effective way of solving the publishers’ collective action problem.
But because this shift required coordination and resulted in higher
prices, the DOJ alleges it amounted to price fixing. According to the
Complaint, the conspiracy to fix e-book prices grew out of private
21
meetings among the publishers at various Manhattan restaurants,
Court held they should instead be subjected to the rule of reason. Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
18. United States v. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); LucasArts Entm’t. Co. v.
Humongous Entm’t. Co., 870 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[T]he statutory right of
intellectual property owners to forbid entirely sales by licensees necessarily includes the
power to restrict the prices at which such licensees may sell licensed material.”). See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark Lemley, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST, §24.9 at 24-59 (explaining an implication of General Electric is that where
“intellectual property owners license their rights by arrangements that contemplate
sublicensing,” so “long as no goods are attached to the primary license, the licensor's
maintenance of the sublicense price is generally lawful”).
19. See Russell Hardin, Collective Action As an Agreeable n-Prisoner’s Dilemma, 16
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 472–81 (1971).
20. Assuming the publishers are right that $9.99 improperly reflects the cost of an ebook, the market likely would have adjusted prices upward over time, as a result of small
changes, as publishers slowly adjusted their pricing arrangements with Amazon, seeking to
increase prices without losing market share. Or it would have resulted in exit from the
market, as publishers could no longer profitably provide e-books at $9.99.
21. Complaint at ¶¶ 39–45.
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22

continued under the guise of joint venture discussions, and took final
23
form with the help of Apple as go-between. The end result was a
concerted shift from wholesale to agency distribution of e-books.
Under the wholesale model, suppliers (publishers) sell products to
24
retailers (Amazon, Apple, etc.), who then set retail prices. The
agency model, by contrast, makes retailers agents of their suppliers.
As agents they have no pricing power: they sell products at prices set
by suppliers and keep a percentage of revenue as commission. Under
the wholesale model, Apple would face two undesirable options:
25
price books higher than Amazon or accept low margins. Thus both
the publishers and Apple stood to benefit from a move to agency
distribution. Apple would get a 30% cut and, standing on equal
footing with Amazon, could then bank on its better tablet to drive up
its market share. And the publishers would solve their $9.99 problem
by retaining sole pricing power, foreclosing Amazon’s destructive
discounting.
The collusion between the defendants took the form of a huband-spoke conspiracy.
Coordination and agreement between
publishers formed the rim, and the vertical Apple Agency
Agreements they negotiated with Apple formed the spokes. Apple’s
involvement eliminated the collective action problem facing the
competing publishers. With Apple at the center, the publishers could
both signal which agency terms they would accept and lock each
26
other into the model, eliminating the risk of defection.
3. Agency Agreement Terms: MFNs and Pricing Tiers

Although the Agency Agreements signed between Apple and
the publishers specifically governed only individual distribution
relationships, they were designed to induce a shift to agency across
the entire industry. Two key features accomplished this goal: mostfavored-nation (“MFN”) clauses and formulaic pricing tiers for newly
released and bestselling titles. Together, these terms effectively

22. Complaint at ¶¶ 46–49.
23. Id. at ¶¶ 50–78.
24. Again, because e-books are licensed to retailers for subsequent sub-license, this is
not strictly true, as the publishers hypothetically could have determined the retail price.
But because of collective action difficulties discussed above, in reality they were unable to
do so.
25. In other words, Apple faced retail price competition. Whether the margins would
have been sufficiently small (or negative) so as to foreclose entry into the e-book market is
a factual question, and one that would be relevant under rule of reason analysis.
26. Complaint at ¶ 61.
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required the publishers to adopt agency distribution with not just
27
Apple, but all their retailers, including Amazon.
The Agency Agreements’ MFN provisions prohibited publishers
from pricing e-books at other retailers lower than at Apple’s
iBookstore, regardless of whether other retailers were an agent of the
publisher or operated under the wholesale model. MFNs arguably
restrict retail price competition, and may have the effect of causing
28
price uniformity. But MFN clauses are not per se illegal, and may be
reasonable restraints if, for example, they are instituted to correct
29
market failures. MFNs can also help protect market entrants by
shielding up-front investments from predatory pricing from
30
competitors.
Pricing tiers in the Agency Agreements linked prices of newlyreleased and best-selling e-books to their respective hardcover list
31
prices, with ostensible maximum prices between $12.99 and $14.99.
In effect, however, these price points amounted to actual prices.
Whereas before wholesale prices often exceeded Amazon’s preferred
32
retail price of $9.99 (with Amazon taking the loss), now retaileragents would take a 30% commission on sales, meaning that in order
for publishers to maintain even current profit margins, retail prices
33
would have to rise, likely to the maximum price tiers.
C. Agreements in Action – The Shift From Wholesaling to Agency

In January, 2010, before the Agency Agreements came into
34
effect, Apple launched the iPad and iBookstore. Apple’s announced
35
e-book price points were well above Amazon’s. When asked why
one would buy an e-book from the iBookstore for $14.99 when the

27. Complaint at ¶ 76.
28. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney-General of Connectitcut, to
Bruce Sewell, Apple’s General Counsel (July 29, 2010), available at http://www.ct.
gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/appleltr080210.pdf.
29. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, 51 U.S. at 877, 879.
30. Id. at 913.
31. Id. at ¶ 75.
32. Amazon Pulls Macmillan Titles in First E-book Skirmish, LATIMES.COM (Jan. 30,
2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/jacketcopy/2010/01/amazon-pulls-macmillan-titlesin-first-ebook-skirmish.html.
33. A book which previously carried a wholesale price of $12 under the agency model
would need to retail for over $17.14 for publishers to receive the same revenue (70% *
$17.14 = $12).
34. Brad Stone, With Its Tablet, Apple Blurs Line Between Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2010, at A1.
35. Id.
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same title was sold for $9.99 on Amazon, Steve Jobs responded: “that
36
won’t be the case . . . the prices will be the same.” For Jobs to be
right about uniform prices, either prices on the iBookstore would
have to end up below what he announced, or prices across the market
would have to rise. In either event, Apple would be insulated:
nowhere would there be lower prices, and they would always receive
a 30% cut. But the new Agency Agreements and Apple’s place at the
hub of the conspiracy ensured prices would go up, not down.
While the agreements insulated Apple from risk, they left
publishers even more exposed. The Agency Agreements effectively
raised the stakes of not acting in concert. If only some publishers
signed Agency Agreements with Apple, not only would their $9.99
problem remain, but as Apple gained a larger share of the market,
those who had signed up would see their margins decline even more
dramatically. They would be obligated to price books on the
iBookstore no higher than offered elsewhere, but would receive less
per book: 70% of retail rather than wholesale prices. Before,
Amazon took the discounting loss; now, on sales through the
iBookstore, the publishers would take the hit, and the loss would be
greater.
If all the publishers signed Agency Agreements with Apple, the
MFN clauses would provide incentive to adopt the same agency
model with Amazon and other retailers. If not, they would all face
declining margin problems as Apple’s market share increased. But
the same collective action problem remained, as did the risk of
defection. With these increased stakes, the publishers badly needed a
way to coordinate and police defection. According to the DOJ,
Apple proved an able constable, providing assurances the other
parties would all sign the same Agency Agreements and thus all face
37
the same risks.
Apparently high-level Apple executives passed
38
information between publishers signaling commitment to the plan.
And it worked: The publishers signed Agency Agreements with
Apple and all subsequently negotiated agency agreements with their
39
other e-book retailers, including Amazon. In the end it took only
four months for most of the publishing industry to jettison the

36. Walt Mossberg, All Things Digital, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://m.wsj.
net/video/20100128/012810atdmossy/012810atdmossy_320k.mp4. In the same clip Jobs can
be overheard remarking that “Publishers are actually withholding their books from
Amazon, because they’re not happy with it.”
37. Complaint at ¶ 69.
38. Id. at ¶¶ 70–74.
39. Id. at ¶¶ 74–75, 79.
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wholesale model in use for over 100 years in favor of the agency
40
model.

III. Discussion
The Antitrust Division chooses to pursue criminal and civil
enforcement by asking whether the investigated conduct constitutes a
“hardcore” violation of antitrust laws. Such conduct, which includes
price fixing, market division, and bid rigging, is typically illegal per se
41
under the Sherman Act, and it alone merits criminal prosecution.
The strength of the government’s evidence affects only whether a
case is brought, not which type: if the conduct merits criminal
prosecution, the government files a criminal case; otherwise,
42
enforcement is civil. The Division will not file a civil case against
defendants engaged in “hardcore” conduct such as price fixing simply
43
because it cannot meet the criminal burden of proof. If the DOJ
44
does not believe it can win a case, it does not bring it.
Despite this, against Apple and the publishers the DOJ alleged a
horizontal price fixing conspiracy—the paradigmatic criminal case—
in a civil action. The decision to bring a civil case in these
circumstances runs directly contrary to Division policy and practice.
Several key legal and strategic factors undoubtedly influenced
DOJ decision-makers, and shed some light on how the Division may
view the case and why it chose to bring a civil action. First, there are
significant questions about the link between deterrence and criminal
sanctions, and reason to believe that criminal penalties may not deter

40. Complaint at ¶ 79.
41. See Antitrust Division Manual, Standards for Determining Whether to Proceed by
Civil or Criminal Investigation (Nov. 2012), at page III-12, available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter3.pdf; Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Laws:
The U.S. Model (Sept. 14, 2006) (remarks before the Fordham Competition Law Institute’s
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, NY), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/218336.pdf; and Gary R. Spratling, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Transparency in
Enforcement Maximizes Cooperation From Antitrust Offenders (Oct. 15, 1999) (presented at
Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/3952.pdf.
42. Baker, supra note 4, at 406 n.6.
43. Id.
44. This is the case for any federal prosecutor contemplating criminal prosecution.
The DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution state the government should proceed with
prosecution where “the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorneys’ Manual, § 927.220.
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as well in practice as in theory. Second, the facts of the case, in light
of recent developments in the application of the per se rule to both
horizontal and vertical price fixing arrangements, raise significant
legal questions about whether the per se rule is appropriate for the
alleged collusion and what the relevant market for assessing
competitive effects should be.
Many strategic considerations likely influenced the decision as
well, including the sufficiency of civil remedies, whether this case
presents a truly novel question of fact or law, maintenance of public
confidence in prosecutorial discretion, assessment of harm to
consumers, Apple’s central role in the case, Amazon’s substantial
market power in the market for e-books, and public perception of the
defendants.
A. Criminal Antitrust Penalties and Deterrence

The argument for imposing criminal penalties on individuals
involved in antitrust violations is based in large part on deterrence.
Standard deterrence theory assumes actors have knowledge of the
law and potential consequences of transgression, and make rational
self-interested choices, weighing the benefits of breaking the law with
the likelihood of detection and the severity of the penalties they
45
would face. To deter companies from engaging in cartel conduct
like price fixing, then, an optimal fine should be greater than the gains
46
of fixing prices, increased to compensate for imperfect enforcement.
Because detection of offenses like price fixing is difficult, and many
transgressors will never be detected, optimal fines likely need to be
47
increased to many times the amount of potential gain. But given the
large profit motives involved, the results of such large fines might well
lead the offending companies into bankruptcy. Antitrust enforcers
face what is known as the “deterrence trap”: deterrence-optimal fines
48
would bring hardship on innocent employees and investors.
A solution to this problem is to penalize individual participation
in cartels by imposing either civil or criminal sanctions, or both.
45. More precisely, rational choice theories of deterrence. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
46. Peter Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as
Punishment under EC Cartel Law, 4 COMP. L. REV. 7 (2007).
47. Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD
COMPETITION 183, 194–195 (2006).
48. See Christine Parker, The ‘‘Compliance Trap’’: The Moral Message in Responsive
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 591 (2006); John C Coffee Jr, “No Soul to
Damn: No Body to Kick:”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
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Because companies can mitigate fines by compensating employees,
49
Criminal penalties,
fines alone are a weak individual deterrent.
especially incarceration, however, are less easily mitigated, and
should provide stronger disincentive for individual participation in
50
antitrust violations. In addition to the increased severity of criminal
sanctions, people may fear the increased investigatory powers that
accompany criminal prosecution, and infer more generally a greater
51
financial and time commitment to enforcement of criminal offenses.
In fact, enhanced investigatory powers may provide the most potent
deterrent effect in light of research showing people are much more
responsive to increased likelihood of detection and enforcement than
52
increased severity of punishment.
Over the past two decades, antitrust penalties have significantly
strengthened. However, there is significant evidence that despite
drastic increases in corporate fines, individual fines, and individual
53
jail terms, more and bigger cartels are being detected. Between the
early 1990s and mid-2000s, average corporate fines have increased
from $480,000 to $44,000,000 and €2,000,000 to €46,000,000, in the
54
United States and European Union, respectively.
Similarly, the
average jail sentence imposed for antitrust violations in the United
States more than doubled from 274 days in the early 1990s to 717 days
55
in 2005-09. Also during this period, the United States and many
other countries implemented corporate leniency programs, offering
reduced penalties, and, for the first in the door, near immunity, in
56
exchange for cooperation and whistle-blowing. Leniency programs

49. Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels
and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 705 (2001).
50. Donald Baker, a former head of the Antitrust Division, reports a very senior
corporate executive telling him: “as long as you are only talking about money, the
company can at the end of the day take care of me . . . but once you begin talking about
taking away my liberty, there is nothing that the company can do for me.” See id.
51. Caron Beaton-Wells & Christine Parker, Justifying Criminal Sanctions for Cartel
Conduct: A Hard Case, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 198, 207 (2013).
52. See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of
Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 7, 8–9 (1991).
53. See John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private
International Cartels, 1990-2005 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=944039; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright,
Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 14–15 (2010).
54. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 53, at 4.
55. Id. at 12–13, fig.6.
56. Nathan H. Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
750 (2009).
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have likely increased cartel detection rates, and combined with
drastically increased penalties, should have had the effect of better
deterring and reducing antitrust behavior. But the number of
international cartels (typically the largest and most harmful to
consumers) discovered per year increased from 4 to 6 per year in the
58
early 1990s to 35 per year in the mid-2000s.
It is possible that
enforcement agencies are simply doing a better job detecting and
prosecuting cartels, but it could just as well be the case that cartels are
fixing prices more frequently despite the increased penalties.
Evidence on recidivism suggests the latter is more likely, and that
cartels are currently being under-deterred: The top ten recidivists
between 1990 and 2009 have had an average of over 15 judgments,
59
with the worst, BASF, had 26 judgments against in in that period. In
the 15-year period 1990-2005, there were 86 companies with three or
more judgments, and seven companies averaging one or more per
60
year.
It is possible that enforcement has been too focused on corporate
fines, and larger increases in individual penalties would better deter
61
antitrust violations. And the fact that the majority of major cartels
have been located outside the United States, where individual
criminal penalties are strongest, suggests inconsistent criminal
penalties worldwide may explain current cartel under deterrence.
But several problems with criminal antitrust penalties have been
identified, particularly behavioral biases that render such measures
less effective than they appear in theory.
Deterrence theory assumes that businesspeople can identify
antitrust behavior and recognize it is a criminal offense, and also
assumes that they can accurately estimate the likelihood they will be
detected and successfully prosecuted. It is not clear, however, that
these are reasonable assumptions. Many cognitive biases have been
shown to distort perceptions about the likelihood of detection and
sanction, and these biases tend to be magnified when individuals
62
attempt to estimate the risks they themselves face.
Empirical

57. Miller, supra note 56, at 760.
58. Connor & Helmers, supra note 53, at 37–38.
59. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 53, at 15 fig.7.
60. Connor & Helmers, supra note 53, at 23 tbl.E.
61. See generally Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 53.
62. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004); John T. Scholz
& Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship
Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (1995).
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evidence for the deterrence effect of criminal enforcement in the
63
And recent evidence from surveys
United States is limited.
conducted during the implementation of criminal antitrust laws in
Australia calls into question several basic assumptions about
64
deterrence.
First, antitrust violations are complex, and businesspeople may
not readily recognize behavior that amounts to criminal antitrust
violations. Analysis of the Australian surveys revealed that a
majority of those surveyed were unable to identify criminal price
fixing, and even where they had accurate knowledge of the law and
available penalties, one-third still judged it likely that businesspeople
65
would engage in conduct meriting criminal penalties. The United
States has a long history of antitrust laws, and people may more
readily recognize antitrust conduct than elsewhere. Still, recognizing
behavior that violates antitrust laws is bound to be more difficult
than, for example, recognizing theft or assault. This is likely to be
even more so in cases involving complex arrangements like the ebooks agreements, where there is arguably no literal price fixing.
Second, an individual’s perception about societal support for
laws tends to be strongly correlated with estimation of the chances of
66
detection and punishment, and compliance.
That is, if a person
thinks society condemns certain behavior and supports laws that
punish such behavior, he is more likely to comply with the law, and
consider the probability of detection and enforcement to be higher.
Likewise if a person himself agrees with the law: in the Australian
survey, this was the strongest predictor of perceived likelihood of
detection and enforcement—more so than prior knowledge of cartel
67
law and sanctions.

63. What empirical evidence there is, is weak. See, e.g., Christine Parker, Criminal
Cartel Sanctions and Compliance: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality, in CRIMINALISING
CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 239
(Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a
Price Fixer? A Behavioural Economics Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS:
CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 263, 267–69
(Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); Jesse W. Markham Jr.,
Does Criminalization of Cartels Work? A Few Lessons from the United States Experience, 3
NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 115 (2012).
64. See Beaton-Wells & Parker, supra note 51.
65. Id. at 210.
66. See Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik Jr., Conscience, Significant Other,
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990);
Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent Do Third Parties Influence
Business Compliance?, 35 J. L. SOC’Y 309 (2008).
67. Beaton-Wells & Parker, supra note 50, at 209–210.
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Beliefs about the inherent criminality of antitrust violations are
also relevant. If “what distinguishes a criminal from a civil
sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which
68
accompanies and justifies its imposition” and if the public does not
see certain antitrust violations as meriting criminal punishment, there
will naturally be lower public support of and agreement with the law.
To the extent that this is true, it will affect individual perception of
the likelihood of detection and prosecution, and by extension the
69
efficacy of criminal penalties in deterring antitrust violations. In the
Australian antitrust criminalization survey, the majority of
respondents believed price fixing cartels should be illegal, but less
than half believed they should be criminal, and less than 20%
70
believed incarceration was appropriate punishment. In the United
States, the backlash to the e-books lawsuit has demonstrated there is
little (or, at least, inconsistent) public support for some antitrust laws.
In particular, although ruinous competition has long since been
71
rejected as a defense to antitrust violations, it seems the argument
that collusion is necessary to combat monopoly is very appealing to
72
the public.
The Antitrust Division has long maintained that individual
73
criminal penalties are more effective than corporate fines, and this is
among the principal reasons that the DOJ policy is to file criminal
suits in cases of hardcore price fixing. While there is insufficient
empirical evidence to conclude this is an effective deterrent, and
there are reasons to question whether criminal penalties function as
well in practice as they do in theory, it is unlikely that the choice of

68. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404 (1958). See also Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 447 (1963).
69. Others have argued criminal law leads rather than follows, public opinion. See,
e.g., Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 217 (1964).
70. Beaton-Wells & Parker, supra note 50, at 212.
71. The Supreme Court first rejected this defense in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The Court has consistently held that competition is
presumptively beneficial, and that no defense may be raised on the “assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable.” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 696 (1978).
72. See, e.g., David Carr, Book Publishing’s Real Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/business/media/amazon-low-prices-disguisea-high-cost.html?_r=0.
73. John M. Connor, The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Cartel
Enforcement: Appraisal and Proposals, 60, n.170 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No.
08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130204.
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civil enforcement in this case reflects a broad change in attitudes
within the Antitrust Division regarding the efficacy of criminal
enforcement. Longstanding policy and lack of clear indication
otherwise also suggest there is no reason to think the DOJ is
rethinking its general stance that criminal penalties are effective
deterrents.
But the various potential problems with criminal
punishments, combined with the facts of this case suggest, at the very
least, that a more nuanced policy regarding criminal enforcement may
be preferable, and that the DOJ may adopt a less categorical
approach in the future.
B. Price Fixing, Modes of Analysis, and the E-Book Conspiracy
1. The Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason Analysis

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
74
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”
Despite this literal (and very broad) wording, the Supreme Court has
long interpreted the provision to prohibit only unreasonable
75
76
restraints. The Act’s purpose is to safeguard competition, and in
examining challenged actions, courts must “form a judgment about
77
the competitive significance of the restraint.” Conduct that raises
78
To determine
prices or reduces output restrains competition.
whether competition is unreasonably restrained, courts apply the rule
of reason and analyze the restraint’s actual effects on competition in a
79
relevant market.
Certain categories of restraint, however, are
presumed to unreasonably restrain competition: conduct that “always
or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output”
80
is condemned per se illegal without further analysis.
In such
circumstances, therefore, a plaintiff need only prove that such an
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
75. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–68 (1911); Northwest Wholesale
Stationers v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (“[E]very
commercial agreement restrains trade. Whether this action violates §1 of the Sherman Act
depends on whether it is adjudged an unreasonable restraint.”).
76. In the words of Justice White, the purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect
“against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly
tends to destroy competition itself.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458
(1993).
77. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
78. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S.
85, 113 (1984).
79. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688.
80. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. at 886 (quoting Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
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agreement exists. Only after extensive experience with certain
business relationships will courts be satisfied this is the case and
81
classify them as per se illegal, and horizontal price fixing is among
82
the few practices courts are comfortable condemning outright.
Over time, however, the Supreme Court has taken an
increasingly nuanced approach to horizontal price fixing. Because
application of the per se rule is appropriate only where restraints
undoubtedly will impede competition, cases in which there was not
clear and unambiguous horizontal price fixing have prompted the
Court to err on the side of caution and delve deeper before
83
condemning the challenged arrangements.
Because in complex
modern markets, arrangements that have the effect of fixing prices
may not necessarily result in net anticompetitive effects, what was
once a very robust rule has been pared back and now seems
84
appropriate only where literal price fixing can be readily identified.
Otherwise, courts must first look at the effects and purpose behind a
practice and determine whether it will “threaten the proper operation
85
of a predominantly free-market economy.”
2. Recent Developments in Horizontal and Vertical Price Fixing

While the Complaint alleges per se violation, in reality the
Division may question whether the sort of conduct at issue in the ebooks case necessarily merits per se illegality. First, the Court’s
recent decision in Leegin removed vertical price fixing (in the form of
minimum retail price maintenance) from the ambit of the per se rule.
Because the challenged arrangement in this case is a series of similar
vertical restraints, it too may be better suited to rule of reason
analysis. The Supreme Court has also added significant wrinkles to
its horizontal price fixing doctrine, and several parallels with two

81. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972).
82. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Per se
illegality stems from the fundamental economic assumption that competitive markets will
correctly price goods to achieve allocative efficiency and maximum social utility.
83. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679 (adopting rule of reason in
assessing legality of horizontal restraint involving professional code of ethics); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding rule of reason
appropriate in examining commercial blanket licensing arrangement, even though a price
fixing agreement was “literally” at issue); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85
(rejecting per se analysis despite finding horizontal price and output restrictions).
84. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1226–28 (2008).
85. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19.
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recent cases suggest the per se rule may be inappropriate for the
challenged conduct here.
Initially, the Court did not distinguish between vertical (supplierretailer) and horizontal (supplier-supplier, retailer-retailer, etc.) price
86
87
fixing arrangements: both were per se illegal. A series of decisions,
culminating in Leegin, created a distinction between horizontal and
vertical restraints: the former remaining subject to the per se rule, and
88
the latter evaluated under the rule of reason.
Like other
anticompetitive conduct evaluated under the rule of reason, vertical
89
restraints may thus be justified by pro-competitive effects.
Horizontal price fixing doctrine has likewise seen change in
recent years. In the 1980s, Sony and Phillips coordinated to charge
license fees for the use of the CD technology in an effort to introduce
90
CDs as an alternative to tape media. This coordinated imposition of
license fees obviously resulted in a markup over competitive prices,
but the Federal Circuit found it justified by the fact that the fees were
91
necessary to recoup sunk investments in technology.
If such
coordination was disallowed, the new technology would never have
92
made it to market.
The Supreme Court followed similar logic in Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS and declined to apply the per se rule to a system of
blanket license fees negotiated by competitors, even though the
93
coordination had the effect of fixing prices. The motivation was to
create a new product: a blanket license to TV stations for copyrighted
94
musical works. Because of the transaction costs involved in licensing

86. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
87. Vertical non-price restraints were deemed subject to rule of reason analysis in
Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) and State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3 (1997) did the same for maximum retail price maintenance.
88. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. at 877.
89. Id.
90. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
91. Id. at 1322–23.
92. Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 251 (3d ed. 2005). See generally Robert S. Pindyck,
Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 619 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) (concluding the danger of sinking
capital into development of new technologies only to be preempted by a competitor’s
standard can induce firms to wait, which in the aggregate can result in market failure).
93. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23. The Court noted its doubt that the practice
threatened the “central nervous system of the economy,” and concluded the more
discriminating examination of the rule of reason was appropriate. Id. at 24 (quoting
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 226 n.59).
94. Id. at 4.
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copyrights from thousands of rights-holders, TV stations were unable
to efficiently license music for broadcast. Coordination between the
rights-holders in aggregating their copyrights and determining a fixed
95
licensing fee was necessary to bring a new product to market.
In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher the Court again narrowed the scope of
96
the per se rule. Texaco and Shell had formed a joint venture to
jointly refine gasoline, and agreed upon a price at which to sell it
97
The Court, in declining to
under their respective brand names.
apply the per se rule, reasoned that joint ventures, which are legally
single entities, must, “like any other firm, . . . have the discretion to
determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the
discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single,
98
unified price.”
The Court quoted Broadcast Music for the
proposition that “joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements
are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes,
where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at
99
all.” Unlike in Broadcast Music, however, Texaco and Shell had not
really introduced a new product. Rather, they jointly produced an
existing product and sold it under their different brands.
3. The E-Books Agreement

The specifics of the e-books case, in conjunction with the
Supreme Court’s recent price fixing jurisprudence, provide Apple and
the publishers with several strong arguments that their conduct
should not be considered per se illegal.
First, the publishers may argue their conduct was necessary to
prevent free riding and protect sunk investments, emphasizing the
vertical restraints, not the horizontal collusion required to put them in
place. Consumers can free ride by browsing Apple’s bookstore (or
physical bookstores, if the relevant market includes all books), which
arguably provides a better experience, only to take advantage of
Amazon’s discounted prices. In Leegin, the Supreme Court held
100
minimum retail price maintenance to be justified along these lines,
and there is considerable evidence that, in practice, such vertical price

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23.
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23).
Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. at 913–14.
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fixing (and, for example, by MFN clauses) makes consumers better
101
off.
Second, the Broadcast Music and Dagher decisions strongly
suggest that in cases where cooperation is either required to introduce
a new product, or perhaps simply if conducted under the guise of a
joint venture, resultant horizontal price fixing should be evaluated
under the rule of reason. On the facts alleged in the Complaint, the
case against the publishers appears strong, and the Division may have
been able to bring and win a criminal per se case against them.
Including Apple, however, changes the picture. Apple will certainly
argue that absent insulation from price competition with Amazon, it
would not have entered the market at all, and can very plausibly
claim significant benefit to consumers by its entry, which resulted in
greater diversity of offerings, and several beneficial innovations
102
(color, pictures, video, etc.).
To a certain extent, the Apple
marketplace for e-books amounts to a new product, and one which
may have required coordination to bring to market. Moreover,
market changes engineered by Apple and the publishers have
103
undeniably coincided with increased, rather than depressed, output.
And the fact that prices and output have risen simultaneously also
strengthens Apple’s arguments about the pro-competitive effects of
the agency model and its entrance into the e-book market. All these
factors indicate a situation where, as in Broadcast Music, the procompetitive benefits of some measure of collusion and horizontal
restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
Third, the Apple Agency Agreements may not literally restrain
pricing of e-books. Because e-books are distributed by license, the
publishers are free to set retail prices, regardless of which model is
104
adopted.
Before Apple’s entry into the market and the shift to
agency distribution, the publishers had but one real option for selling
e-books: Amazon. Because of this monopsony, no publisher could
individually exercise its pricing power and impose minimum retail

101. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints:
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391–414
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., MIT Press 2008) (reviewing empirical research on RPM and finding
broad consensus that it most often results in consumer benefit, including higher quality
products and better services.), available at http://www.economics.ubc. ca/files/2013/05/
pdf_paper_margaret-slade-exclusivecontracts-verticalrestraints.pdf.
102. Answer, United States v. Apple, et al., 12-CV-2826, 2012 WL 1862008, at ¶ 1
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) [hereinafter Answer].
103. Answer at ¶ 93. This flies in the face of basic economic theory, which suggests a
downward sloping demand curve, whereby higher prices correspond with less demand.
104. Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 18.
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prices. Apple’s entry provided the publishers’ opportunity to adopt a
distribution model Amazon otherwise would have blocked. They will
argue that, in effect, their power to set prices is unchanged under the
agency model. All that really changes is Amazon’s veto on retail
pricing, a power to which it is not legally entitled.
These arguments may have been sufficient to convince the DOJ
that the agreements between the publishers and Apple do not quite
reach the level of traditional, hardcore per se illegal horizontal price
fixing. This may be why the Complaint appears to allege both per se
and rule of reason cases. On the one hand, the Complaint alleges an
“understanding and concert of action” among the publishers and
Apple to “raise, fix, and stabilize retail e-book prices, end price
competition among e-book retailers, and to limit retail price
105
competition among” the publishers.
On the other, it contains
lengthy exposition of anticompetitive effects—the sort of arguments
necessary to bring a rule of reason case. Thus while the Complaint
does allege a horizontal price fixing conspiracy, this may simply be
posturing. Perhaps actions speak louder than words: after all, the
DOJ filed a civil suit, not a criminal one.
4. Relevant Market

Also questionable is the proposed definition of the relevant
market, which would be critical if the case were analyzed under the
rule of reason. The relevant market is critical in rule of reason cases
because it is key to determining defendant market power and
106
potential anticompetitive effects of a restraint.
Although the
Supreme Court’s famous footnote 59 in Socony-Vacuum explained
that market power is not a precondition to application of the per se
107
rule, subsequent decisions have demonstrated the Court is in fact
willing to consider the participants’ market positions in determining
108
per se illegality. If a court were to look at the relevant market in
examining anticompetitive effects of the alleged conspiracy, the
proposed definition might prove a weak point in the government’s
case.
The government proposes a narrow definition limited to trade e109
books, excluding print. It presents several strong arguments for this

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Complaint at ¶ 95.
See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1956).
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 226 n.59.
See cases cited supra note 83.
Complaint at ¶ 99.
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position, noting several advantages of e-books and differences
110
between them. And it concludes e-books have no good substitutes.
Whether or not this is the case, elsewhere the Complaint convincingly
tells the story of beleaguered publishers inspired to collusion by their
concerns about the adverse impact of Amazon’s e-book discounting
111
on print books.
The complaint specifically alleges that the
publishers were gravely concerned about the large price differential
between print and electronic versions and that expectations of lower
112
prices would spill over to print. This would negate the “competitive
advantages they held as a result of years of investments in their print
113
book business.”
Thus despite the Division’s arguments to the contrary, its own
Complaint evidences the fact that many consumers do consider ebooks substitutes for print books. After all, electronic and print
books contain generally the same content, are written by the same
authors, and are funded by the same investments of the publishers. If
the competitive threat to print books was enough to motivate the
publishers to engineer an elaborate scheme to change the industry
distribution model, the converse is likely true as well: print books are
a competitive threat to e-books. If this is so, then the relevant market
may well include all books. In which case the government will face a
tougher task should it be required to prove anticompetitive effects. If
the government had brought a criminal case rather than civil, that
task would have been tougher still.
C. Strategic Considerations

The Division is usually not fortunate enough to have a open-andshut case, and price fixing cases are often brought based on
circumstantial evidence. And there is always risk involved in bringing
charges before a jury. Thus if the legal issues discussed above were
insufficient on their own to have ruled out a criminal case, several
strategic considerations weighing in favor of a civil action may have
tipped the balance.
1. Civil Injunction

The availability of a civil injunction provides the government a
powerful tool to restore the pre-Apple status quo. If the principal

110.
111.
112.
113.

Complaint at ¶ 99.
Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 34.
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goal of the Division in bringing the case was to return prices to
previous levels rather than punish the defendants or provide an
example for deterrence purposes, then the Division may have
weighed the risks of bringing the case against the sufficiency of a civil
remedy and found a criminal case unattractive. Also, the DOJ’s
Principles of Federal Prosecution state that where a criminal
prosecution would otherwise be called for, it may be unnecessary if
114
“there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”
As of early 2013, Apple is the only remaining defendant, with the
115
publishers all having settled with the DOJ. The settlements entered
between the United States and publishers mandate termination of the
Agency Agreements, a return to the wholesale model, and restitution
116
to purchasers of e-books.
That all the settlements contain this
restitutionary remedy lends support to the view that the DOJ’s
overriding concern was a return to the status quo.
2. Novel Issues of Fact or Law

Antitrust Division standards for determining whether to bring
criminal charges contain a discretionary exception for “truly novel
117
issues of fact or law.” It is possible the Division found the particular
arrangement between Apple and the publishers falls into this
exception. The government has criminally prosecuted arrangements
involving series of vertical restraints before, and the courts has found
118
them per se illegal. But these both involved a group of competitors
at the supplier level colluding with a retailer possessing substantial
market power. The publishers, by contrast, colluded with Apple,
who, although a powerful company with significant power in other
markets, had yet to enter the market for e-books. With that said, the
Division is generally not shy about bringing criminal charges where

114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorneys’ Manual, § 9-27.220.
115. Cyrus Farivar, Macmillan, sole e-book publishing holdout, settles with Justice, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 8, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/macmillan-sole-ebook-publishing-holdout-settles-with-justice/.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, Inc., 12 CIV. 2826 DLC, 2012 WL 3865135
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2012) (order granting motion for entry of final judgment against three
of the five publishers).
117. Antitrust Division Manual, supra note 39, at page III-12.
118. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (finding conscious
parallelism combined with several “plus factors” sufficient to infer an illegal horizontal
agreement from a series of vertical distribution agreements); Toys “R” Us v. FTC, 221
F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 2000) (inferring a horizontal agreement from a series of vertical
agreements).
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the collusion does not correspond perfectly with previous examples.
In light of this, it appears unlikely this particular arrangement
presents a sufficiently novel issue of law that would foreclose criminal
prosecution.
Perhaps more importantly, cases for which the application of the
per se rule is not entirely clear tend to be brought anyway because
120
they involve blatant anticompetitive conduct and effects.
Two
factors may distinguish the e-books case: the anticompetitive effects
here are not entirely self-evident, and the defendants have several
potential pro-competitive arguments to offer in defense of the new
model. Regardless, if this was a principal reason for bringing a civil
rather than criminal case, the Division would likely have made that
clear. Doing so would prevent uncertainty about whether policies are
in flux. In light of its silence, it is hard to imagine this exception was a
key factor in deciding to forego criminal prosecution, though in
conjunction with other considerations, the relative novelty of the facts
may have played a part.
3. Prosecutorial Discretion

Concern about public perception of antitrust enforcement, and
federal prosecution in general, may also have weighed against a
criminal case. The Sherman Act’s bipolarity—both criminal and civil
penalties flow from the same words—vests a great deal of
prosecutorial discretion with the DOJ. The choice between seeking
civil or criminal redress on behalf of the public for antitrust violations
is a serious responsibility and getting it wrong will have serious
consequences. Inappropriately bringing criminal cases carries the risk
of appearing to the public an erratic or arbitrary enforcer, perhaps
motivated more by political factors, back-room dealing, or favoritism
than strict adherence to application of the antitrust laws.
And yet a steady hand is needed on the wheel of antitrust, and
the Division, like any other public prosecutor, should seek to apply
laws consistently. Clear enforcement policies establish predictable
boundaries between civil and criminal conduct. To this end the
government
regularly
prosecutes
specific
categories
of
anticompetitive conduct criminally, and others civilly. Horizontal
price fixing and market allocation nearly always give rise to criminal

119. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding intent
requirement introduced in Gypsum typically does not extend to per se violations).
120. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,, 468 U.S. 85 (rejecting per se analysis
despite clear horizontal price and output restrictions).
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charges, and others, including tie-ins, merger cases, and restrictive
121
membership rules, result in civil cases.
So there may be tension between, on the one hand, consistency
in prosecuting cases, and on the other, public perception of impartial
and even-handed enforcement. In this case, the Division may have
concluded bringing a criminal case against defendants for violations
widely perceived to be worthy of civil penalties would expose the
government to criticism of abuse of its prosecutorial discretion. The
attendant impact on public confidence in the government’s antitrust
enforcement might well defeat whatever positive impact (deterrence,
retribution, or public confidence) stemmed from the criminal case.
4. Sympathetic Narratives and The Case Against Apple

Whether criminal or civil, Amazon would inevitably loom over
the case. Backlash against the case indicates the public views
Amazon as a monopolist, and there appears to be genuine
122
appreciation for increased diversity of e-book offerings. Regardless
of their merits, the Division is undoubtedly aware of these feelings.
And the government is equally aware that at trial the defendants
would paint themselves as struggling to cast off the traditions of print,
the dominant paradigm for centuries and embrace the nascent world
of e-books, a transition made all the more difficult by Amazon’s
machinations.
A criminal case against Apple would also be more difficult to
123
win. Not only is the legal case against Apple weaker, Apple would
have a compelling narrative to tell a jury. The government would
have to overcome a perception of an Amazon-monopolized industry
to which Apple, a hugely popular company, widely esteemed for its
innovation and forward-looking nature, attempted to introduce a bit
of its magic. And despite the added difficulty of doing so, the
government was probably unwilling to bring the case without naming
Apple, the hub of the conspiracy.
D. Putting It All Together: An Explanation for an Odd Lawsuit
1. Some Horizontal Price Fixing is Not Per Se Illegal

It is possible the Division believes the sort of conduct engaged in
by the defendants should not be considered illegal per se. They may
121. Barnett, supra note 41.
122. See Carr, supra note 72.
123. For several reasons discussed herein, including Apple’s history using the agency
model and its position at the retail rather than supplier level, and general Apple-philia.
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have read the tea leaves in Broadcast Music and Dagher, which
suggested evolving attitudes toward horizontal restraints. The nature
of competition in high-tech industries may also demand a more
nuanced view of collusion. If so, the DOJ may treat differently
collusive conduct that falls short of naked horizontal price fixing
motivated solely by a desire to extract consumer surplus. The DOJ
may be headed toward a policy where some horizontal price fixing is
not illegal per se, and does not call for criminal prosecution. The
allegation of a per se violation in the Complaint contradicts this view,
but the Division may simply be hedging its bets, or this may reflect an
unwillingness to surrender that bargaining chip so early in the game.
It does seem unlikely, however, that the DOJ would unilaterally
determine certain conduct should no longer be considered per se
illegal, and unlikelier still that they would make prosecution decisions
on the basis of such a determination. Antitrust laws may well end up
with a more nuanced approach to horizontal restraints, much like
vertical restraints, but the DOJ will probably wait for the Supreme
Court to make that decision first.
2. Not All Horizontal Price Fixing is Equal (or Treated Equally)

On the other hand, if we take the complaint at its word, that the
DOJ considers the collusion between Apple and the publishers illegal
per se, it is possible the DOJ is in the midst of a major change in
policy.
One possibility is that the DOJ may be changing its policy about
criminal prosecution of horizontal price fixing cases. It may believe
certain per se price fixing violations do not merit criminal
consequences—a “softcore” category of per se illegal price fixing.
Another is that the e-books case may be an example of an
intermediate category of cases the Division believes are provable by a
preponderance of the evidence but not beyond a reasonable doubt. It
is possible the government is simply not willing to give up so easily in
cases where they encounter burden of proof problems. Both of these
possibilities, however, amount to sweeping policy changes. Either
changing the scope of criminal conduct under the Act, or adopting
Division prosecution policy that is inconsistent with general DOJ
policy, especially without formal notice, seems shortsighted.
Transparency in enforcement is one of the Division’s top priorities,
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and this sort of shift would very likely merit announcement to the
124
public.
3. Simply an Outlier?

Finally, the decision could simply be an outlier. It is conceivable
that the decision was made based on political, rather than doctrinal,
reasons. Because this would seemingly be a major violation of the
government’s prosecutorial discretion, this seems exceedingly
unlikely. It is more probable the DOJ judged the benefits of a
nonadherence in this case to outweigh the costs of departing from
strict adherence. If this is so, there are several prudential reasons that
likely would have weighed in favor of a one-time exception.
First, the DOJ has an interest in maintaining public confidence in
antitrust enforcement.
On the one hand, possible adverse
consequences might include weaker antitrust deterrence (or not,
depending on the deterrence efficacy of criminal sanctions) and
increased uncertainty about the scope of criminal conduct under the
Sherman Act. Such uncertainty can result in deadweight losses as
companies make decisions based on incomplete information about
the legality of their actions.
And such costs are likely to be
exaggerated in fast moving, high-tech sectors like e-books. On the
other, given public perception of Apple and the publishers as battling
the monopolistic Amazon, a departure from form might be the better
choice—especially so if sufficient civil remedies were available, as
seems to be the case.
Second, the decision may reflect prudential considerations about
the dangers of over enforcement and over deterrence in high-tech
industries. These risks are greatest in high tech sectors, like e-books,
where market forces are least predictable to enforcement agencies,
and high rates of innovation lead to rapid changes in market
structure. The costs of misidentifying anticompetitive conduct are
potentially very great: many high-tech innovators face
multidimensional competition, and high-tech markets are more likely
winner-take-all. Thus there is good reason to proceed cautiously in
the area, and combined with the various strategic and legal
considerations that weighed against criminal enforcement, it seems
most likely the DOJ made an individualized decision to bring a
125
unique enforcement action.
124. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust
Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2009); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright,
Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153 (2010).
125. Spratling, supra note 41.
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IV. Conclusion
Unless the DOJ decides to publicly reveal the details of its
decision making process, it will never be completely clear what
exactly motivated the DOJ to bring a civil case against Apple and the
publishers.
Concerns about public perception of antitrust
enforcement, concerns about over deterrence and chilling effects in
high-tech industries, the deterrence efficacy of criminal sanctions, and
the availability of civil injunctions seem the likeliest explanations.
But it remains to be seen whether the decision will prove a one-time
exception (and possibly go unexplained), or a harbinger of long-term
changes in antitrust policy.
Regardless of whether the case proves to be an outlier and what
the specific reasons were for choosing to bring a civil case, the
Division needs to maintain transparency about its antitrust
enforcement policies—especially those concerning the choice of
whether to pursue civil or criminal sanctions.
Not only is
transparency in decision-making key to maintaining public trust in
law enforcement, it is also central to antitrust deterrence: generally, in
providing clear guidelines about what conduct is legal and what is
proscribed; and more specifically in encouraging cooperation from
antitrust offenders. Transparency leads to predictability, and the
Division’s leniency program depends on transparency in prosecution
standards. If prospective cooperating parties cannot predict the
likelihood of prosecution, or cannot be certain of their treatment
following cooperation, they will not come forward.
Finally, there are good reasons to speculate the decision to bring
a civil case against Apple and the publishers was motivated by
positive changes in how the DOJ views the high-tech industry, as well
as the need for a more flexible approach toward complicated
arrangements in emerging markets. It would be a good thing if this
case reflected a general shift in that direction. And simply explaining
why exactly it was that no criminal case was brought against Apple
and the publishers would be a step in that direction.

